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 This appeal involves supplemental water-rights claims in the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication (“SRBA”) for the Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs, two on-stream reservoirs 
owned and operated by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) in Basin 65.  
In most years, annual inflows from the watersheds above the reservoirs exceed available storage 
capacity.  In such years, if Reclamation were to fill the reservoirs for irrigation storage as soon as 
possible after the prior year’s irrigation use, Reclamation would have to “spill” unneeded water 
in mid to late spring when stream flows and flood risks are greatest.  To help protect downstream 
communities and property, over fifty years ago Reclamation developed protocols for filling its 
reservoir in a manner that mitigates downstream flooding risks.  Under these protocols, now set 
out in “flood-control rule curves,” Reclamation passes or releases early inflows to create space 
for capturing peak flows later in the year.   
 In 1993, the Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”) implemented a 
computerized accounting program to track water distribution in Basin 65.  As an expedient, the 
program treats all reservoir inflows as “diversions” for water-rights purposes.  Under this rule, in 
any year that Reclamation passes or releases water for flood-control purposes, the United States’ 
decreed storage rights are satisfied “on paper” before Reclamation physically fills the reservoirs 
for irrigation use.  Likewise, all reservoir inflows stored after the date of “paper fill” are deemed 
“unaccounted for” and available for appropriation by others.  Reclamation filed the supplemental 
water rights claims to protect its historical reservoir operations in light of IDWR’s novel 
accounting procedures.  The supplemental claims accept the rule that all reservoir inflows are 
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diversions, which limits the United States’ decreed storage rights to first-available flows.  But 
Reclamation began flood-control operations before 1971, when water rights could be acquired 
under Idaho law simply by appropriating water for beneficial use.  Under its flood control 
operations, Reclamation physically stored — and thereby appropriated for irrigation and other 
beneficial uses — the last water flows into the reservoirs (prior to the irrigation season).  The 
supplemental claims assert beneficial-use rights in these last stream flows. 
 In a related ruling (on review of IDWR’s similar accounting procedures for federal 
reservoirs in Basin 63), the district court acknowledged that the United States and its contract 
space holders had “acquired a vested constitutional method water right” through the beneficial 
use of waters stored in federal reservoirs after flood-control releases.  See U.S. Add. 2 at 17.  But 
the district court disallowed the United States’ supplemental claims for the Cascade and 
Deadwood Reservoirs, on the erroneous view that the Basin 65 claims are precluded by the 
“Payette Decree,” a 1986 partial decree of water rights in the Payette River system.  As 
explained in the United States’ opening brief (U.S. Br. at 29-40), claim preclusion does not apply 
because the United States’ supplemental claims are predicated on IDWR’s accounting rule (that 
all reservoir inflows are diversions), which was first imposed after the issuance of the Payette 
Decree and which departed from the usage of “diversion” in preexisting law.   
 In their response briefs, Respondents the State of Idaho and Suez Water Idaho, Inc. 
(“Suez”) fail to refute that IDWR’s accounting rule materially changed the rules for exercising 
reservoir storage rights.  Instead, they make three sets of arguments that disregard the rule 
change and thus misconstrue the supplemental claims of the United States.  First, Respondents 
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emphasize the need for “finality” in water adjudications to guard against the “enlargement” of 
decreed rights.  But because the supplemental claims limit use to one physical fill, they do not 
assert enlarged storage rights; they assert enlarged diversion rights, predicated on the novel rule 
that all inflows are diversions and on the historic practice (in flood-control years) of passing and 
releasing unneeded inflows before physical storage and beneficial use.   
 Second, the State argues that this Court must disregard IDWR’s reinterpretation of the 
United States’ storage rights, because the district court lacked jurisdiction (upon review of the 
United States’ supplemental claims) to set aside the accounting procedures.  This argument is a 
non sequitur.  The supplemental claims are predicated on IDWR’s accounting procedures and 
presume IDWR’s authority to count all reservoir inflows as “diversions” for water-rights 
purposes.  Moreover, the validity of IDWR’s accounting procedures is presently before this 
Court in a related set of appeals.  Whether all reservoir inflows are “diversions” for water-rights 
purposes is a legal question pertinent to both sets of appeals.  This Court need not (and should 
not) disregard that question in either case.   
 Third, the State and Suez argue that the United States failed to prove the supplemental 
claims and that affirmation of the claimed rights would injure other users and interfere with 
water-rights administration.  These merits arguments misconstrue the supplemental claims, were 
never addressed by the district court, and are inconsistent with the district court’s decisions on 
the United States’ pending supplemental claims in Basin 63.  The district court’s res judicata 
ruling should be reversed, and the United States’ supplemental claims in Basin 65 should be 




I. The United States’ Supplemental Claims Are Not Precluded by the 1986 Partial 
Decree in the Payette Adjudication 
A. Claim Preclusion Does Not Apply 
 As previously explained (U.S. Br. at 29-30), under the doctrine of res judicata, claim 
preclusion applies only to claims that actually were or could have been litigated in a prior 
proceeding.  Berkshire Inv., LLC  v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012).  Claim 
preclusion does not apply where changed factual or legal circumstances give rise to a new claim 
that could not have been brought at the time of the initial action.  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 
Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000); Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 181, 
369 P.2d 1010, 1016 (1961); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162 (1945).  
The United States demonstrated that its supplemental claims for the Cascade and Deadwood 
Reservoirs could not have been brought in the Payette Adjudication prior to the 1986 Partial 
Decree (“Payette Decree”) because the supplemental claims are premised on computerized 
accounting procedures that postdate the Payette Decree and reinterpreted the United States’ 
storage rights in a manner not dictated by the Payette Decree or by preexisting water law.  See 
U.S. Br. at 31-40.  The response briefs of the State and Suez do not show otherwise.  
1. IDWR’s Accounting Procedures Departed from Existing Law 
 As the United States demonstrated (U.S. Br. at 31-40), IDWR’s 1993 accounting 
procedures departed from preexisting law by adopting a novel use of the term “diversion.”  
Specifically, for expedience, IDWR adopted a dictionary definition equating “diversion” with 
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any change in the physical course of a waterway.  See U.S. Add. 3 at 65, ¶ 30 (citing Webster’s II 
New College Dictionary 339 (3d ed. 2005) (“Diverted means ‘[t]o turn aside from a direction or 
course.”))  Using this definition of “diversion,” IDWR determined for the first time that “all 
natural flow[s] that enter[] a federal on stream reservoir” are “diverted” for water-rights purposes 
and must be charged toward the satisfaction of decreed rights, whether or not the flows are 
appropriated for irrigation or other use.  Id.  
 This novel approach, the United States explained (U.S. Br. at 35), “disassociate[d] water 
diversions from water appropriation.”  Under longstanding Idaho water law, the term “diversion” 
had always been used together with, or as a synonym for, “appropriation.”  See, e.g., Marshall v. 
Niagara Springs Orchard Co., 22 Idaho 144, 125 P. 208, 210 (1912); Branstetter v. Williams, 8 
Idaho 257, 67 P. 800, 804 (1902).  Reflecting this understanding, the Idaho Constitution 
enshrines “[t]he right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream 
to beneficial uses.”  Idaho Const., Article 15, § 3 (emphasis added).  This Court has determined 
that water can be appropriated for water-rights purposes without a physical diversion, e.g., to 
preserve instream recreational use.  See State Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 96 
Idaho 440, 444-445, 530 P.2d 924, 928-29 (1974); see also Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 
144 Idaho 1, 7, 156 P.3d 502, 508 (2007) (diversion not necessary for “valid appropriative right 
for stock watering”).  But this Court has never held that water can be “diverted” for water-rights 
purposes without an appropriation.  Cf. In re SRBA, 157 Idaho 385, 389, 336 P.3d 792, 796 
(2014) (addressing the right of an “appropriator” to “divert” under a storage right).   
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   By treating all reservoir inflows as “diversions,” the computerized accounting 
procedures count two types of “diversions” that are not associated with appropriations.  First and 
foremost, when Reclamation allows natural stream flows to pass through an on-stream reservoir 
without physically filling the reservoirs — i.e., when dam outflows equal or exceed reservoir 
inflows — Reclamation is not removing water from the river or otherwise “appropriating” water 
in any meaningful sense.  See U.S. Br. at 32-33.  It is axiomatic that any owner of a water right 
may choose not to exercise the right.  Cf. Jenkins v. State Dept. of Water Resources, 103 Idaho 
384, 388-390, 647 P.2d 1256, 1260-62 (1982) (addressing risks of nonuse).  Likewise, when 
available water flows are more than sufficient to satisfy an owner’s annual right of appropriation, 
the owner has discretion when to exercise the right within the temporal limits (if any) imposed 
by a relevant license or decree.  See, e.g., Dunn v. Boyd, 46 Idaho 717, 217 P. 2, 3 (1928) (court 
may fix dates within which an appropriator “may divert”).  Nothing in the law of prior 
appropriation suggests a different rule for on-stream storage reservoirs.   
 Second, as also explained (U.S. Br. at 37-38), inflows stored and released for flood-
control purposes are not appropriated under Idaho law.  If it were possible for Reclamation to 
perfectly predict winter and spring precipitation, associated snowmelt and runoff rates, and other 
factors influencing reservoir inflows, Reclamation could satisfy its reservoir storage rights and 
meet flood control objectives with one physical fill per year.  Specifically, Reclamation could 
exercise its discretion (as above) to let unneeded natural stream flows pass, until the time it needs 
to begin storing natural flows to physically fill the reservoirs for the irrigation season.  But 
because Reclamation cannot forecast reservoir inflows until it can assess actual winter snowfalls, 
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Reclamation starts forecasting in January.  Reclamation begins filling its reservoirs earlier (pre-
forecasts) on the assumption that there will be no runoff in excess of available reservoir capacity.  
Once reliable runoff forecasts can be made, Reclamation passes through inflow and, as 
necessary, releases a portion of the stored water as dictated by its flood-control rule curves, and 
then fills the reservoirs during peak flows.  During years when inflows exceed available reservoir 
capacity,1 this method of filling the reservoirs results in a partial physical “refill” (to compensate 
for flood-control releases), not simply the passing of unneeded flows prior to the exercise of 
reservoir storage rights.   
 Nonetheless, the net effect on water appropriation is the same.  As the United States 
explained (U.S. Br. at 37-38), regulating stream flows to avert flooding is not a “use” of water 
per se, and has never been held to constitute an appropriation requiring a license or decreed 
water right under Idaho law.  Thus, at the time of the Payette Adjudication, Reclamation’s 
practice of passing and releasing water for flood-control purposes before filling the reservoirs for 
irrigation and power purposes was consistent with Idaho law and did not interfere with its 
licensed storage rights (ultimately confirmed in the decree).   
2. The State and Suez Fail to Refute the Material Change in Circumstances 
 Contrary to the State’s characterization (State Br. at 24-25), the foregoing argument does 
not rely on the United States’ “subjective[]” view, at the time of the Payette Decree, that its 
                                                          
1 The available capacity is total capacity minus carryover, after distributions for irrigation have 
been made and when the new storage season begins.   
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historic reservoir operations were consistent with the laws of prior appropriation.  Rather, the 
United States relies on longstanding Idaho legal authority on water appropriation, together with 
the absence of any Idaho precedent treating flood-control as an appropriation, both of which the 
State ignores.  Because the State cannot refute the United States’ legal argument, the State 
instead argues (State Br. at 25-39) that this Court cannot consider the changed legal 
interpretation, because IDWR’s accounting procedures cannot be challenged in the SRBA 
proceedings.  But changed factual and legal circumstances are undisputedly relevant to claim 
preclusion.  Kuenzli, 134 Idaho at 226, 999 P.2d at 881; Berry, 84 Idaho at 181, 369 P.2d at 
1016; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 324 U.S. at 162.  Demonstrating that the 1993 accounting 
procedures effected changed circumstances is not the same as arguing that the procedures should 
be set aside.  See pp. 22-26, infra.   
 For its part, Suez argues that treating all reservoir inflows as diversions for water-rights 
purposes has always been “mandated by Idaho’s Prior Appropriation Doctrine,” Suez Br. at 31, 
and that the “relevant * * * legal principles” at the time of the Payette Adjudication “were 
exactly the same as they are now,” id. at 14.  But Suez fails to make its case.  First, Suez 
contends (Suez Br. at 31, 33-34) that Reclamation must be charged with diverting all available 
inflows toward its decreed rights to “prevent impermissible enlargement” of those rights and to 
ensure that Reclamation does not “stor[e] more water than authorized” under its decreed or 
licensed rights.  This argument does not follow.  The owner of a storage right (or any other water 
right) does not enlarge the right merely by declining to satisfy it with first available flows.  As 
the United States’ explained (U.S. Br. at 34), the risk of not storing first available flows — i.e., 
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the risk that later flows will not be available to satisfy the full storage right — falls solely on the 
owner of the right. 
 Second, Suez argues (Suez Br. at 23) that a duty to use first available flows can be found 
in the “four corners” of the Payette Decree (or previous licenses).  But Suez points to no specific 
text to support this assertion.  The Payette Decree confirmed the United States’ rights to “use” 
water from the Payette River, for “irrigation” and “power storage” and for “irrigation from 
storage” and “power from storage,” in amounts up to 700,000 acre feet per annum (“AFA”) for 
Cascade Reservoir and 163,000 AFA for Deadwood Reservoir.  R. 533-34.  The Payette Decree 
did not address “diversion” rights or impose “diversion” limits.  See U.S. Br. at 38.  To be sure, 
the United States’ rights to appropriate water under the Payette Decree are limited to the decreed 
storage amounts.  See Glenn Dale Ranches v. Shaub, 94 Idaho 585, 588, 424 P.2d 1029, 1032 
(1972).  But the Payette Decree simply confirmed that number based on the earlier state licenses.  
The Payette Decree (and earlier licenses) did not temporally limit when Reclamation may divert, 
nor specify that Reclamation must divert and appropriate first available flows. 
 Third, Suez argues (Suez Br. at 35) that Reclamation must be “incentivized” to use first 
available flows to “make more water available for juniors and maximize the use of the State’s 
water resources.”  Suez correctly observes (Suez Br. at 18) that Idaho water law requires 
“beneficial use” and prohibits “waste.”  See Idaho Ground Water Appropriators v. Idaho Dept. 
of Water Resources, 160 Idaho 119, 131, 369 P.3d 897, 909 (2016).  Suez fails to show, 
however, that Reclamation’s flood-control operations contribute to waste.  As the United States 
explained (U.S. Br. at 33), flows that Reclamation passes or releases for flood-control operations 
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are “never removed from the river or made unavailable to other water users or prospective 
appropriators.”  Suez’s real argument is that flood-control operations change the timing of stream 
flows.  Suez contends (Suez Br. at 35, 38) that Reclamation should be compelled to store first 
available flows in order to make more water available to junior appropriators during the 
irrigation season.  But Reclamation passes or releases flows for flood-control purposes only in 
years when the failure to do so would cause stream levels to rise above the flow-rate target for 
flood control.  See U.S. Br. at 17.  Raising stream flow levels at times of flood risk does not 
make more water available at times of greatest irrigation need.  For downstream water users with 
storage capacity and storage rights, the change in timing is irrelevant.   
 This leaves Suez with the anomalous argument (Suez Br. at 36-37) that reservoir inflows 
“must count toward the satisfaction” of the United States’ decreed storage rights because 
“IDWR’s distribution of water * * * has nothing to do with beneficial use.”  Suez argues (id.) 
that once IDWR “distributes” water to the United States’ storage rights, Reclamation must store 
and put that water to beneficial use or lose such rights.  But this assertion says nothing about 
whether IDWR’s newfound “distribution” departed from preexisting law.  IDWR did not begin 
“distributing” water to the United States via the accounting procedures until 1993.2  As explained 
(pp. 4-7, supra), by “distributing” first-available flows to the United States storage rights — 
notwithstanding Reclamation’s flood-control operations — IDWR took away Reclamation’s 
                                                          
2 IDWR does not physically distribute water to the reservoirs.  The “distribution” is a paper 
exercise utilized by IDWR to track the satisfaction of water rights. 
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discretion to delay the exercise of its rights for flood-control purposes.  This was (and is) a 
fundamental reinterpretation of the United States’ storage rights. 
 Suez’s contention that IDWR’s “accounting methodologies * * * do not define water 
rights or dictate Idaho’s law of prior appropriation” is misplaced.  IDWR’s task is to “distribute 
water * * * in accordance with the prior appropriation doctrine.”  In re SRBA, 157 Idaho at 393, 
336 P.3d at 800 (citing Idaho Code § 42-602).  In this regard, IDWR is charged with 
“follow[ing] the law,” not making the law.  Id.  Nonetheless, this Court has recognized IDWR’s 
discretion “to determine when [the quantity amount] has been met for each individual decree[d]” 
right, id. at 394, 336 P.3d at 801, including the discretion to regulate the “use [of] decreed water 
right[s]” in light of the “public’s interest in [the] valuable commodity” of water.  See American 
Falls Reservoir Distr. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 880, 154 P.3d 433, 451 
(2007).  In the present case, this Court could affirm IDWR’s accounting procedures as an 
accounting expedient, or it could find the procedures consistent with prior appropriation in the 
abstract (i.e., without regard to how reservoir storage rights historically have been exercised).  
Neither determination would be inconsistent with the United States’ argument that the 
accounting procedures changed the rules when adopted.  In other words, as previously explained 
(U.S. Br. at 40), the fact that IDWR’s accounting procedures depart from preexisting law does 
not make the procedures per se improper.  If this Court affirms IDWR’s Basin 63 Accounting 
Order, the rule that all inflows are diversions presumably will carry the force of law. 
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3. The United States’ Supplemental Claims Were Not “Ripe” at the Time of 
the Payette Adjudication 
 The State’s argument (State Br. at 19-25) that the United States’ supplemental claims 
were “ripe” in 1969 (when the Payette Adjudication was initiated) is readily controverted.  The 
United States acknowledged (U.S. Br. at 30-31) that its supplemental claims “are based on the 
diversion and beneficial use of water that dates back to before 1965.”  But as the United States 
explained (id. at 31-35), the supplemental claims are also “inextricably bound up with” the logic 
of the 1993 accounting procedures, which postdate the Payette Adjudication.  Following IDWR’s 
accounting procedures, the supplemental claims disassociate “diversions” from “appropriations” 
and assert diversion rights (rights to divert for irrigation and power storage) in amounts that 
exceed appropriation rights (rights to use stored water for irrigation and power).  These claims 
are possible (and understandable) only in the context of the new rule that all reservoirs inflows 
are diversions, a rule that did not control the United States decreed rights until after the 1993 
accounting rules were implemented.3     
4.  The United States Was Not Obligated to Seek a Flood-Control “Remark” 
in Anticipation of the Present Legal Controversy 
 There is likewise no merit to the State’s attempt (State Br. at 22-25) to ground claim 
preclusion on the United States’ supposed failure to seek a “refill” remark in the Payette 
                                                          
3 Contrary to the State’s argument (State Br. at 20), the United States does not contend that claim 
preclusion is inapplicable because it would have been “impossible” to challenge IDWR’s 1993 
accounting procedures at the time of the Payette Adjudication.  The supplemental claims do not 
challenge the accounting procedures, just the opposite; the supplemental claims are predicated 
upon the accounting procedures.  See pp. 22-26, infra.   
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Adjudication to protect its flood-control operations.  While acknowledging (id. at 22) that 
reservoir operations are not themselves a “beneficial use” of water, the State fails to appreciate 
the corollary point:  not all reservoir operations are a “use” of water for purposes of water-rights 
regulation.  Reservoir operations that do not implicate the availability of water for appropriation 
and use by others are simply outside of Idaho water-use law (law of prior appropriation).  To be 
more precise, the United States’ historic flood-control operations were outside of such law, until 
IDWR adopted accounting procedures that treat all reservoir inflows as “diversions” subject to 
water-rights administration.   
 In this context, the repeated assertions by the State and Suez that the Payette Decree did 
not authorize flood-control operations are beside the point.  See State Br. at 22-25, 43, Suez Br. 
at 6, 15, 23, 43.  If a water right historically has been exercised in a manner contrary to principles 
of prior appropriation — e.g., if a group of water users on a tributary historically have allowed 
out-of-priority use under certain conditions — the beneficiaries of such an arrangement 
reasonably must seek a remark memorializing such practice when the user’s water rights are 
formally adjudicated.  See U.S. Br. at 35-36.  This is so because the historic practice would be 
unprotected by law and contrary to the terms of a decree if not memorialized therein.  Id.  But 
neither the State nor Suez argue that the United States needed a license or decreed water right to 
conduct flood-control operations incidental to irrigation and power storage, or that the United 
States could have acquired such right.  The absence of flood-control authorization — either as a 
“use” of the decreed storage rights or by way of a “remark” — can be a material omission with 
claim-preclusive effect only if authorization was (and is) required.   
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 At the time of the Payette Adjudication, the United States’ flood-control operations were 
not contrary to the terms of its licenses or to Idaho water law.  There was no Idaho statute, 
regulation, or case precedent identifying flood control operations incidental to reservoir storage 
as a “use” of water requiring a separate water right.  Indeed, there is no such authority to this 
day.  In its Basin 63 Accounting Order, IDWR justified its accounting procedures on the view 
that all inflows are diversions toward reservoir storage rights.  See U.S. Add., Tab 3 at 37-38 
(¶¶106-111) 40-41 (¶¶ 116-124), 65 (¶ 30).  IDWR did not determine that the flood-control 
operations are a “beneficial use” of water.  This is not, as Suez alone suggests (Suez Br. at 20), 
because flood-control operations are “sloppy” or “waste[ful].”  The United States’ flood-control 
operations have broad public benefits, which neither IDWR nor Suez denies.  See Suez Br. at 46.  
Because flood control is undisputedly beneficial, it is not a “beneficial use” of water only 
because it does not implicate water appropriation and use.4  As IDWR acknowledged in the 
Basin 63 Accounting Order, this fact makes flood-control operations “independent of the water 
rights system and prior appropriation.” Id. at 74 (¶ 53). 
                                                          
4 The State and Suez cannot have it both ways.  If regulating flows for flood-control purposes is 
not a water use, a license or decreed right cannot be required.  To the extent that the State and 
Suez are arguing that flood-control operations are water uses, they are arguing for a change to 
Idaho law.  The United States’ supplemental claims do not assert storage rights for flood control, 
because IDWR has never treated flood-control as a water use.  If this Court determines that 
flood-control operations are a water use, it should remand to enable the United States to conform 
its supplemental claims accordingly.  Except for the addition of the flood-control purpose, the 
supplemental claims (and proof required) would not change.   
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 Suez speculates (Suez Br. at 15) that, in the absence of Idaho precedent specifically 
excluding flood-control operations from water-use regulation, Reclamation “could have and 
should have wondered” whether its flood-control operations required a water-rights license or 
decree.  But the ability to “wonder” about potential legal issues is not the same as the ability to 
assert a claim on a specific accounting rule not yet adopted. 5  As just explained, IDWR’s 
accounting procedures for federal on-stream reservoirs are not based on the view that storing 
water or regulating flows for flood-control purposes constitutes a water use.  IDWR’s accounting 
procedures are based on the rule that all inflows are diversions, which prevents Reclamation 
from letting any available inflows pass for any reason.  The supplemental claims make no sense 
and could not have been filed in the absence of this novel accounting rule.6 
 Contrary to the State’s argument (State Br. at 23-24 & n. 27), the “risk” that flood-control 
operations pose to the United States’ ability to physically fill the Cascade and Deadwood 
Reservoirs is not germane to whether the United States could or should have brought its 
supplemental claims in the Payette Adjudication.  The United States acknowledged (U.S. Br. at 
                                                          
5 For this reason, issues about “refill” or flood-control operations that arose in other contexts (see 
State Br. at 21 n. 24) prior to or around the time of the Payette Adjudication do not prove that the 
supplemental claims could have been filed in the Payette Adjudication. 
6 The State’s observation (State Br. at 24 n. 28) that the district court adjudicated a federal 
reservoir claim with a flood-control remark after IDWR adopted its accounting procedures says 
nothing about Reclamation’s obligations at the time of the Payette Decree.  Nor is there any 
significance to the State’s argument (id.) that the United States could have sought a flood control 
remark when the United States’ decreed rights were confirmed in the SRBA.  See U.S. Br. at 4-5, 
16.  The State has never argued that the 2003 partial decrees have claim-preclusive effect.   
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17) that Reclamation’s flood-control operations make it more difficult for Reclamation to 
physically fill the reservoirs to maximum capacity for irrigation use.  Reclamation assumed this 
risk to provide a reasonable degree of protection against downstream flooding, and Reclamation 
developed flood-control rule curves to manage the risk of non-filling.  It does not follow, as the 
State intimates (State Br. at 23-24 & n. 27), that the United States assumed the risk of claim 
preclusion by not raising the legal status of its flood-control operations at the time of the Payette 
Adjudication.  These are completely different issues.   
B. The United States’ Supplemental Claims Are Not Precluded by Statutory 
Forfeiture or By Decree Language Referencing Statutory Forfeiture 
 As explained in the United States’ opening brief (U.S. Br. at 23-24), the district court 
disallowed the United States’ supplemental claims on the grounds of res judicata and two 
additional, purportedly independent reasons:  (1) because the Payette Decree purportedly 
referenced forfeiture under former Idaho Code § 42-1411 (1969) (repealed), and (2) by operation 
of that 1969 finality statute.  See R. 2512-2518.  As explained (U.S. Br. at 26-27), these are not 
independent grounds for claim preclusion.  The 1969 finality statute is properly construed as 
“memorializ[ing] * * * the application of res judicata to water adjudications.”  See State Dept. of 
Ecology v. Acquavella, 112 Wash. App. 729, 739, 51 P.3d 800, 805 (Wash. App. 2002) 
(interpreting an analogous state statute).  Because the statute did not dictate the forfeiture of 
claims beyond the rule of claim preclusion, there can be no statutory forfeiture or forfeiture by 
reference to the statute for the reason already addressed: claim preclusion does not apply.   
17 
 
1. The 1969 Finality Statute Embodied Res Judicata Principles and 
Limitations 
 While asserting that the United States’ interpretation of the 1969 finality statute lacks 
merit (State Br. at 15-17), the State offers no alternative interpretation.  Instead, the State makes 
generic observations about finality that are not disputed.  For example, the State observes (id. at 
15) that general stream adjudications are unique statutory proceedings warranting their own 
finality rule.  The United States agrees.  As the United States explained (U.S. Br. at 26-27), claim 
preclusion — the loss of claims that “could have been” brought in earlier an earlier action 
whether or not the claims were actually litigated — applies to claims arising from the “same 
transaction or series of transactions.”  Marivalla v. J.R. Simplot Co., 161 Idaho 455, 459, 387 P. 
3d 123, 127 (2016) (citing Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 
943, 951 (2012)).  This “transactional” test does not fit general stream adjudications, which are 
not limited to any particular transaction or series of transactions giving rise to water rights, but 
instead are initiated by a statutorily-authorized notice calling out all claims to the use of water 
from a particular water system or source.  See Idaho Code § 42-1407.  Accordingly, the manifest 
purpose of former § 42-1411 (1969) was to clarify that claim preclusion would apply to any all 
claims that could be filed in response to such notice.    
 The State also stresses that finality is “essential” to general stream adjudications.  See 
State Br. at 16 (quoting Idaho Ground Water Assoc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 160 
Idaho 119, 128, 369 P.3d 897, 906 (2016)); see also State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 12, 16, 951 P.2d 
943, 947 (1998)).  Again, the United States concurs.  The State cites a 2010 brief that the United 
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States filed in the district court in proceedings on the “Lemhi Decree,” a 1982 partial decree of 
water rights on the Lemhi River similar to the Payette Decree.  See State Br. at 12-13 & 15 n. 15.  
In that brief, the United States observed that the 1969 finality statute reflected (1) “a bedrock 
principle concerning the finality of general adjudication decrees,” see State Br. at Tab E at 20; 
and (2) the “importance of obtaining finality in general adjudication decrees based on the 
principle of res judicata,” id. at 23 (emphasis added).  The State mistakenly implies (State Br. at 
15 n. 15) that the United States has changed its position on these issues.  It has not.  As reflected 
in the 2010 brief, the United States has consistently interpreted the 1969 finality statute as 
mandating finality “based on the principle of res judicata.”  State Br., Tab E at 23. 
 The State misconstrues this argument by failing to acknowledge that res judicata has 
equitable limitations.  Specifically, res judicata bars claims not actually litigated by the parties in 
a prior suit (claim preclusion) only when the claims could have been brought in that prior 
proceeding.  U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000); 
Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 181, 369 P.2d 1010, 1016 (1961); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162 (1945).  As previously explained (U.S. Br. at 27), the language of 
the 1969 finality statute implied the same equitable limitation.  The statute provided for 
forfeiture in the event of a water user’s “fail[ure] to appear and submit proof of [a] claim.”  See 
Idaho Code § 42-1411 (1969) (emphasis added).  A litigant cannot “fail” at a task the litigant had 
no reasonable ability to perform.  To construe the 1969 finality statute as mandating the 
forfeiture for claims that could not have been brought in a general adjudication would be 
“unreasonably harsh” and “arbitrary,” contrary to ordinary rules of statutory construction.  See 
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Jasso v. Camas Cty. 151 Idaho 790, 798, 264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011); Avista Corp., Inc. v. Wolfe, 
549 F.3d 1239, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 2008).   
 The State does not dispute this analysis.  Instead, the State incorrectly describes the 
United States’ position as “disparaging” the “doctrine of res judicata” itself.  See State Br. at 16 
n. 17.  Contrary to the State’s characterization (id. at 16), the United States did not argue that the 
1969 finality statute would unfairly “penalize” water users or result in an “arbitrary forfeiture of 
property rights” in the ordinary circumstance, i.e., when applied to water-rights claims that could 
have been asserted in a properly-noticed general stream adjudication.  The United States simply 
demonstrated that the 1969 finality statute cannot reasonably be construed as mandating the 
forfeiture of claims that could not have been brought in the subject general adjudication.  Again, 
the State and Suez do not argue otherwise.  It is true that the State and Suez argue that the United 
States reasonably could have (and thus should have) brought its supplemental claims in the 
Payette Adjudication.  But that argument is erroneous for reasons already discussed above and is 
no response to the issue of statutory interpretation.   
2. The 1969 Finality Statute Did Not Apply to Partial Decrees 
 In addition to demonstrating that the 1969 finality statute is properly interpreted as 
embodying the principles of res judicata, the United States also made the further point (U.S. Br. 
at 27) that the forfeiture provision of the 1969 finality statute did not apply to the Payette Decree, 
because that decree was a partial decree.  The 1969 finality statute stated in relevant part that the 
“[t]he decree” in a comprehensive stream adjudication “shall be conclusive as to the rights of all 
existing claimants upon the water system,” and that “when [such] a decree has been entered, any 
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water user who has been joined and who failed to * * * submit proof of his claim * * * shall be 
held to have forfeited all [then existing] rights.”  Idaho Code § 42-1411 (1969).  It is undisputed 
that that this forfeiture provision was repealed before the entry of such a decree in the Payette 
Adjudication, and that the Payette Adjudication remained incomplete at the time it was 
consolidated with the SRBA.  Accordingly, under the plain terms of the statute, forfeiture under 
§ 42-1411 (1969) never attached to the Payette River system.   
 In making this argument, the United States did not contend, as the State implies (State Br. 
at 13-15) that the 1986 Payette Decree was not a “final” judgment, or that the decree lacked 
claim-preclusive effect under res judicata principles.  To the contrary, the United States 
acknowledged that the Payette Adjudication court certified the 1986 partial decree as “final” 
under Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(b), with the intent of entering a final judgment as to all claims that 
were or could have been brought within the Payette River basin, except for expressly excluded 
claims.  Consistent with this understanding, the United States argued below (R. 1907-08, R. 
2273-77, 2366-69) and in its opening brief (U.S. Br. at 29-40) that its supplemental claims fall 
outside the rule of claim preclusion only because they could not have been brought in the Payette 
Adjudication.  The United States did not argue that the Payette Decree lacked claim-preclusive 
effect as to claims that could have been brought in the Payette Adjudication.   
 As for the 1969 finality statute, the United States observed (U.S. Br. at 27-29) that if 
former § 42-1411 “somehow could be construed as compelling preclusion beyond the [equitable] 
rule” of claims preclusion — i.e., if the statute is construed as mandating forfeiture of water-
rights claims that could not have been brought within the Payette Adjudication — such arbitrary 
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forfeiture should be limited, per the plain terms of the statute, to decrees “conclusive as to the 
rights of all existing claimants upon the [subject] water system.”  The State acknowledges (State 
Br. at 17) that the 1986 Payette Decree was not “conclusive” of all rights on the Payette River, 
but insists that the “partial” nature of the 1986 decree makes no difference with respect to the 
forfeiture, because the Payette Adjudication court intended the 1986 partial decree to trigger 
statutory forfeiture. 
 That argument cannot be sustained.  As the United States explained (U.S. Br. at 24), the 
1979 Director’s Report included a “recommended decree” comprehensive of “all of the rights 
* * * to the waters of the Payette River.”  R. 524.  In this context, the report recommended a 
“conclusion of law” that entry of the “recommended decree” would result in the forfeiture of 
rights “as provided in Section 42-1411.”  Id.  In contrast, the Payette Adjudication court issued a 
“partial decree” that excluded specified claims and did not reference statutory forfeiture.  R. 452.  
Thus, while it is undisputed that the Payette Adjudication court entered a final decree with claim-
preclusive effect, there is nothing in the text of Payette Decree specifically addressing whether 
the final partial decree would trigger statutory forfeiture.  Moreover, even if the court had made 
such a proclamation, it cannot be given effect where the statute required a decree comprehensive 
of all claims.  See Idaho Code § 42-1411 (1969).  No court can by fiat change the terms of a 
statute.  On this issue of statutory interpretation, the State has no response.    
 Instead, the State argues (State Br. at 11-13) that the United States waived its 
“challenges” to the 1969 finality statute and 1986 Payette Decree by not raising them in district 
court.  But the United States is not challenging the 1969 statute or the Payette Decree; the United 
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States merely notes that the district court misconstrued the plain terms of the statute and the 
decree.  Moreover, the United States made these observations (U.S. Br. at 27-29) in response to 
the district court’s holding that the 1969 statute and the 1986 Payette Decree operate 
independently of res judicata principles and claim preclusion.  R. 2512-2518.  The State did not 
make that argument below.  See, e.g., R. 2288-89 (equating the terms of the 1986 Partial Decree 
and 1969 forfeiture statute with the “principles of res judicata”).  In any event, as just noted, the 
State and Suez do not argue on appeal for an interpretation of the 1969 finality statute that would 
provide for the forfeiture of claims that could not have been brought within the Payette 
Adjudication.  Therefore, the question whether the Payette Decree (as a partial decree) triggered 
forfeiture under the 1969 finality statute need not be resolved.   
II. This Court May Consider Whether IDWR’s Accounting Procedures Departed from 
Preexisting Law 
 Instead of attempting to refute the United States’ argument that IDWR’s 1993 accounting 
procedures fundamentally reinterpreted the United States’ storage rights (see pp. 4-7, supra), the 
State erroneously contends (State Br. at 25-39) that this Court may not consider the change.  To 
consider the departure from preexisting law, the State argues, would sanction a challenge to 
IDWR’s accounting procedures, which may only be brought in proceedings under the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act (“Idaho APA”).  This argument cannot stand.  
A.  The United States’ Supplemental Claims Presume the Validity of the 1993 
Accounting Procedures 
 To begin with, the United States’ supplemental claims plainly do not challenge IDWR’s 
1993 accounting procedures.  In demonstrating that the accounting procedures departed from the 
23 
 
preexisting law, the United States showed why its supplemental claims could not have been 
brought in the Payette Adjudication.  Contrary to the State’s arguments (State Br. at 26 n.29, 30), 
this demonstration was not a refusal to “accept” the accounting procedures or a request that the 
accounting procedures be set aside.  The supplemental claims can only proceed if the accounting 
procedures (and rule all reservoir inflows are diversions) remain in place. 
 Nor is the State correct to suggest (State Br. at 30) that the United States’ present 
argument was not made below.  The United States explained below that the IDWR’s accounting 
procedures “upended” the historic practice of storing for irrigation use after flood control 
releases, R. 2273, and left federal storage rights “unprotected,” R. 2271.  This is so, the United 
States showed, because the accounting procedures introduced the concept of “paper fill,” which 
“severed the connection between physical fill and * * * reservoir accounting,” leaving the 
existing storage rights “incapable of protecting” physical storage following flood-control 
releases.  R. 2273-74.  This is a just another way of saying that the accounting procedures 
disassociated diversions from appropriations.  See pp. 4-7, supra.   
 The State is also mistaken in arguing (State Br. at 30) that the United States’ arguments 
are based on a “mischaracteriz[ation]” of the district court’s decision.  In finding the United 
States’ supplemental claims foreclosed by the Payette Decree, the district court relied in part on 
the proposition that “a claimant wishing to preserve a historical method of administration * * * 
must raise that issue at the time [a] claim is adjudicated.”  R. 2515-2516.  The district court used 
the term “historical method of administration” to mean a “scheme” for water distribution that 
“might not pass muster” under the “prior appropriation system.”  See Memorandum Decision and 
24 
 
Order, SRBA Subcase 63-33732 at 6 (Sept. 1, 2016) (U.S. Add. 1).  By invoking this rule, the 
district court necessarily (and mistakenly) assumed (1) that the United States’ flood-control 
operations — which do not involve any appropriation or claim of priority use — would not “pass 
muster” under the law unless “memorialized” in a decree; and (2) that IDWR’s accounting 
procedures simply enforced the preexisting rules of prior appropriation.  See U.S. Br. at 35-36. 
 In any event, whether or not the district court recognized the relevance of the issue, the 
fact that IDWR’s diversion rule departed from preexisting law matters to claim preclusion.  The 
State seems to argue (State Br. at 31) that the United States was required to challenge IDWR’s 
accounting procedures as a condition precedent to filing its supplemental claims.  This Court has 
held that the Idaho APA “provides the procedures for challenging [an] accounting method” 
adopted by IDWR, In re SRBA, 157 Idaho at 394, 336 P.3d at 801, and that a party may not bring 
an “as applied” challenge to the constitutionality of IDWR regulations without exhausting 
administrative remedies.  American Falls Reservoir Distr. No. 2, 143 Idaho at 870-72, 154 P.3d 
at 441-43.  But neither decision supports the self-contradictory argument (State Br. at 31) that a 
party must challenge accounting procedures in order to bring claims based on the procedures.   
 Nor is there any merit to the State’s argument (State Br. at 31-36) that the United States 
improperly augmented the record on appeal by citing IDWR’s Basin 63 Accounting Order and 
two related district court decisions, which are included in the addendum to the United States’ 
brief.  The United States cited the district court decisions (U.S. Add. 1-2) to advise this Court of 
the status of the United States’ supplemental claims for federal on-stream reservoirs in Basin 63 
and the status of the district’s court related decision on review of IDWR’s Basin 63 Accounting 
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Order, which is presently on appeal to this Court.  See U.S. Br. at 8-9, 21-22, 40-42.  The State 
does not argue that it is improper to advise this Court of related claims, decisions, and appeals.   
 As for IDWR’s Basin 63 Accounting Order (U.S. Add. 3), the United States did not cite 
that order, as the State contends (State Br. at 31), to “cobble together an administrative record” to 
challenge the order or to challenge IDWR’s informal accounting procedures for Basin 65.  As 
previously explained (U.S. Br. at 18), IDWR’s computerized accounting procedures for Basins 
01, 63, and 65 were all adopted informally, without an administrative order or rule making.  Id. 
at 18, 21.  In 2013, on its own volition, IDWR initiated “contested case” proceedings7 to review 
its accounting procedures for Basin 63.  Id. at 21.  Those proceedings culminated in the Basin 63 
Accounting Order, which is the first (and only) formal action setting out IDWR’s accounting 
rules for federal on-stream reservoirs and the rationale for those rules.  Id. at 21-22.  The United 
States cited the Basin 63 Accounting Order as legal authority that explains the accounting rules 
and their departure from preexisting law.  See U.S. Br. at 9, 18-20, 21-22, 37-39.  While 
mistakenly arguing (State Br. at 31) that the departure is irrelevant to claim preclusion, the State 
does not argue (nor could it) that the Basin 63 Accounting Order is not final agency action on 
matters committed by law to IDWR.  See In re SRBA, 157 Idaho at 393-94, 336 P.3d at 800-801. 
 Instead, the State argues that “it cannot and should not be assumed” that the Basin 63 
Accounting Order “serves as a substitute for a fully developed administrative record and final 
                                                          
7 A “contested case” is any [agency] proceeding * * * that may result in the issuance of an 
order.”  Idaho Code § 67-5240. 
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order of the Director on the Water District 65 accounting system.”  To the extent the State is 
arguing that a “fully developed administrative record” is a prerequisite for challenging the Basin 
65 accounting procedures, the State’s argument is misplaced.  For reasons stated, the United 
States’ supplemental claims do not challenge the Basin 65 accounting procedures.  To the extent 
the State is arguing that the Basin 63 Accounting Order is not relevant for understanding the 
Basin 65 accounting procedures, the State is simply mistaken.8  The State does not contend (and 
cannot show) that IDWR’s accounting rule treating all reservoir inflows as diversions operates 
differently in Basin 65 from its operation in Basin 63.  Nor does the State explain how the state 
engineer’s expertise (see State Br. at 34) could matter on this issue.  Whether Reclamation had 
discretion, prior to IDWR’s accounting procedures, to determine when to exercise its reservoir 
storage rights is a question of law.  That IDWR’s accounting procedures eliminated any 
discretion possessed by Reclamation is beyond dispute.   
B. This Court May Determine the Validity of IDWR’s Accounting Rule on 
Diversions 
 In addition to explaining that claim preclusion does not apply (U.S. Br. at 29-40), the 
United States also explained (id. at 40-42) that the supplemental claims would be unnecessary if 
IDWR’s accounting rule on diversions is set aside.  Stated differently, if this Court determines 
                                                          
8 The State argues (State Br. at 32, n. 37) that there are “significant differences” between the 
Payette River Basin (Basin 65) and the Boise River Basin (Basin 63).  But none of the 
differences proffered by the State is relevant to the application of IDWR’s accounting rule 
treating all inflows as diversions.  Among other things, the proffered differences in the federal 
statutes and contracts that govern the operation of the reservoirs are irrelevant to whether historic 
reservoir operations resulted in beneficial-use water rights under State law. 
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that flows passed or released for flood control purposes are not properly counted toward the 
satisfaction of federal storage rights, even as an accounting expedient, there would be no legal 
basis for the United States supplemental claims.9  See U.S. Br. at 5-6, 35.  
 Contrary to the State and Suez’s argument (State Br. at 26-29, Suez Br. at 26-29), this 
Court has jurisdiction to address that issue on appeal.  In arguing that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction (id.), the State and Suez mistakenly rely on this Court’s decision on Basin-Wide 
Issue 17.  See In re SRBA, 147 Idaho 385, 336 P.3d 792; see also U.S. Br. at 20-21 (explaining 
proceedings).  In that case, this Court recognized that IDWR has broad authority to oversee the 
distribution of water to water rights and to choose accounting methodologies to determine when 
the quantity element of a water right is satisfied.  In re SRBA, 147 Idaho at 393-94, 336 P.3d at 
800-801.  This Court held that the district court did not “abuse its discretion” when “declining to 
address when the quantity element of a storage right is considered filled” or in “stating that such 
                                                          
9 As explained (U.S. Br. at 7), Black Canyon Irrigation District (“Black Canyon”) objected to the 
United States’ supplemental claims on the theory that the claims were unnecessary.  The United 
States did not similarly object to its own supplemental claims, but did note that the issue of 
reservoir “refill” was then pending in the proceedings on Basin-Wide Issue 17.  See R. 22 & n. 7.  
The United States advised that it would withdraw its supplemental claims as unnecessary if the 
district court determined, in the basin-wide proceedings, that the United States’ decreed rights 
could be exercised consistent with flood-control operations.  Id.  That question was subsequently 
taken up in the “contested case” proceedings on the Basin 63 Accounting Procedures.  See U.S. 
Br. at 9, 21-22.  In its opening brief, the United States noted Black Canyon’s objection and the 
related appeal regarding the Basin 63 Accounting Order to explain the relatedness of all pending 
appeals.  See id. at 40-41. Thus, there is no merit to the State’s argument (State Br. at 25-26) that 
the United States’ “waived” a challenge it did not make to the district court’s ruling on Black 
Canyon’s objection.  The United States presents its view herein on the jurisdictional question, 
solely in response to the State’s extended argument on the issue (State Br. at 26-29).  
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a determination was within [IDWR’s] discretion.”  Id. at 394, 336 P.3d at 801.  In so holding, 
this Court did not find that IDWR has exclusive authority to resolve all legal issues relevant to 
the satisfaction of water storage rights.  Id.  Nor did this Court preemptively address the district 
court’s jurisdiction to address the “refill” issue in connection with the adjudication of the United 
States’ supplemental water-rights claim.  Id.   
 The State also errs in relying on Idaho Code § 42-1401D.  State Br. at 27.  That section 
provides that “[r]eview of an agency action * * * shall not be heard in any water rights 
adjudication.”  Idaho Code § 42-1401D.  But this mandate is limited to agency “action * * * 
subject to judicial review” under the Idaho APA.  Id.  As just noted, IDWR has not issued a final 
rule or order on its Basin 65 accounting procedures.  See § 67-5201(3)(a)  (“ ‘agency action’ 
means * * * the whole or part of a rule or order”).  A district court’s consideration of a legal 
issue that arises with respect to the adjudication of a water right does not constitute “review of 
* * * agency action” simply because the same issue arises in a related “contested case” 
proceeding.    
  In any event, as the United States further explained (U.S. Br. at 41), IDWR’s Basin 63 
Accounting Order is now before this Court in a related set of appeals.  The question whether all 
reservoirs inflows are diversions is a legal issue common to those appeals (involving IDWR’s 
Basin 63 Accounting Order), and the present appeals (involving the United States Basin 65 
supplemental claims).  This Court can and should resolve all of the appeals with an 




III. The Merits of the Supplemental Claims Should Be Resolved on Remand 
 The State asserts (State Br. at 39) that the United States’ supplemental claims raise issues 
requiring “careful consideration” that should not be decided in this appeal, and that the appeal is 
no place for “speculating about hypothetical injuries.”  Similarly, Suez argues (Suez Br. at 22) 
that the United States’ supplemental claims raise “complicated issues” on the merits that cannot 
be decided on appeal but “would have to be remanded to the SRBA court.”  Yet both the State 
and Suez proceed to argue the merits of the claims and expound on the supposed harms that will 
be unleashed if the supplemental claims are confirmed.  These arguments misconstrue the 
supplemental claims, are not pertinent to the appeal, and should be disregarded. 
A.   The United States Presented Sufficient Proof of Its Supplemental Claims 
 As explained in the United States’ opening brief (U.S. Br. at 6 & n. 1), the United States’ 
supplemental claims are based on undisputed historic stream-flow data showing flows into the 
Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs.  The United States claimed a priority date of 1966 for its 
supplemental claims because that was a year of historically high stream flows.  The United States 
averred that in 1966, like other years with flows in excess of available reservoir capacity, the 
United States passed or released (for flood-control purposes) all stream flows in excess of the 
flows stored for irrigation and power use.  Based on these actual “diversions” (inflows), the 
United States claimed the right to divert total annual inflow up to the amount recorded in 1966.  
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But the United States expressly limited its “use” rights to the amounts previously decreed.10  See 
R. 20 (memo supporting supplemental claims); R. 824-29 (supplemental claims).  In this manner, 
the United States claimed beneficial use of the last flows into the reservoir before irrigation use 
(i.e., the water physically stored after flood-control releases).  In arguing (Suez Br. at 16-22) that 
“it will be no easy task to prove * * * up” these rights, Suez erects imaginary “hurdles” (id. at 
17) that vanish once the United States’ claims are properly construed. 
 First, Suez argues (id. at 18) that the United States “must show that the claimed water 
was not diverted and put to beneficial use under some other right.”  To the contrary, the United 
States claims extra diversions only to account for waters that are passed and released through the 
reservoir system and not appropriated for use.  Because the supplemental claims do not assert 
beneficial use rights (to store water for irrigation and power uses) beyond the amounts already 
decreed, there is no threat of “hoarding or wasting” and the authorities Suez cites on those points 
(id.) are inapposite.11  Nor is the State correct in arguing (State Br. at 22), that the limited nature 
of the supplemental claims is a question of “subjective” intent.  When stating its claims, the 
United States specifically provided that the “total quantity appropriated” — i.e., the amount 
                                                          
10 As explained (U.S. Br. at 5), the diversion right is reflected in the right claimed for storage; the 
use right is reflected in the right claimed for irrigation and power use “from storage.”   
11 Suez’s mathematical examples (Suez Br. at 19, 34) also fail to show “waste.”  In one breath, 
Suez mistakenly argues (id. at 34) that the physical “refill” that results from reservoir operation 
under the flood-control rule curves (pp. 6-7, supra) constitutes an improper enlargement of use 
rights.  In the next breath, Suez concedes (Suez Br. at 19) that waters released during flood 
control operations do “nothing” and are not a water “use.”  Suez cannot have it both ways.    
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nominally diverted under the rule that all inflows are diversions — would be “limited” to the 
storage and use permitted under its decreed storage rights.  R. 825, 827. 
 Second, Suez argues (id. at 19) that the United States cannot show beneficial use of the 
“second fill” water.  But there is no genuine dispute that the United States stored and delivered 
water for irrigation and power during the years in question.  Under Suez’s view (and IDWR’s 
accounting procedures), the beneficial use was not “as of right” under the United States’ decreed 
rights, because the diversion limits were satisfied by first-available flows, which were passed and 
released before Reclamation fully filled the reservoirs and released water for irrigation use.  But 
this reinterpretation of the decreed rights (which prompted the need for the supplemental claims) 
does not raise genuine disputes of fact about the beneficial use of “second fill” water. 
 Third, Suez argues (id. at 20) that the United States cannot show that “the additional 
storage under the [supplemental claims] was reasonable and necessary.”  Suez’s argument is 
predicated on the general rule that diversions in excess of beneficial use are wasteful.  See Ward 
v. Kidd, 87 Idaho 216, 226-27, 392 P.2d 183, 190 (1964).  This rule cannot reasonably be applied 
in the context of IDWR’s accounting procedures for on-stream reservoirs, where unappropriated 
inflows are counted as diversions.  As the United States’ explained (U.S. Br. at 16) and as Suez 
itself acknowledges in a footnote (Suez Br. at 42, n. 30), because the United States owes a duty 
of care to downstream communities, the United States’ flood control operations are not “sloppy” 
and “waste[ful]” as Suez otherwise argues (Suez Br. at 20), nor a mere matter of “convenience” 
as the State implies (State Br. at 41).  The United States reasonably “diverts” more water than 
necessary to fill its reservoirs — i.e., reasonably passes and releases inflows that otherwise 
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would be available to satisfy its storage rights — to meet its duty of care to downstream 
communities. 
B.  The United States’ Supplemental Claims Are Not a Collateral Attack on the 
2003 Partial Decrees 
 The State and Suez’s failure to properly construe the United States’ supplemental claims 
is also fatal to their arguments (State Br. at 40-44; Suez Br. at 24-26) that the supplemental 
claims are a “collateral attack” on the 2003 partial decrees that reaffirmed the United States’ 
licensed and decreed rights for the Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs after the Payette 
Adjudication was consolidated with the SRBA.  See U.S. Br. at 4-5, 15-16.  The State and Suez 
do not contend that the 2003 partial decrees have claim-preclusive effect.  See State Br. at 40-44; 
Suez Br. at 24-26.  Instead, they argue that the supplemental claims contradict limits allegedly 
imposed in the 2003 partial decrees.  Those implied limits do not exist.   
 The 2003 partial decrees are based on the 1986 Payette Decree and the prior State 
licenses.  The licenses confirmed rights to “use” water, for irrigation and power purposes, up to 
specified amounts tied to reservoir capacity.  R. 719-20.  The licenses did not purport to limit 
reservoir inflows to the stated amount of “use.”  Id.  Since the watersheds regularly produce 
flows in excess of reservoir capacity and Reclamation had (and has) no ability to prevent 
inflows, such an interpretation is untenable.  The “refill” issue arose only after IDWR 
determined, as a matter of water-rights accounting, that all inflows are to be counted as 
diversions.  The only right asserted in the supplemental claims that arguably goes beyond the 
licensed and decreed rights is the claimed right, in years when total inflows exceed available 
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reservoir capacity, to pass or release unneeded inflows before physically filling the reservoirs for 
irrigation and power use.  Because that issue was not presented in the proceedings on the 2003 
partial decrees, the United States’ supplemental claims cannot be a collateral attack on those 
decrees.   
 Nor is the State correct in arguing (State Br. at 40), that the United States “collaterally 
attack[ed]” the 2003 partial decrees by noting Black Canyon’s objection that the supplemental 
claims are unnecessary.  Should this Court determine that reservoir inflows released for flood 
control purposes cannot be counted toward reservoir storage rights — even as a matter of 
administrative expedience — such a ruling plainly would not “impeach” the 2003 partial decrees.  
See State Br. at 40 (citing Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455, 461, 195 P. 625, 627 (1921)).  Such a 
ruling would simply mean that the decrees must be implemented on their plain terms in 
accordance with the conventional use of “diversion” (as limited to water appropriations).   
C.  The United States Supplemental Claims Do Not Threaten Junior Users or 
Water-Rights Administration 
1.   The Supplemental Claims Cannot Injure Other Water Users 
 Finally, there is no support for the various assertions by the State (State Br. at 36-44) and 
Suez (Suez Br. at 9, 18-19, 31, 37-38) that the United States’ supplemental claims threaten injury 
to other water users or other “significant and adverse unintended consequences” (State Br. at 36).  
As explained (pp. 9-10, supra), the United States’ flood-control operations — as distinct from 
the storage of water for power and irrigation use — do not remove water from the Payette River 
system; they impact water availability only as a matter of the timing of stream flows.  If 
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Reclamation were to fill the reservoirs with first-available flows, Reclamation would be 
compelled to “spill” excess flows generally during times of peak flows and greatest flood risk.  
When Reclamation began flood-control operations around 1957, Reclamation started passing and 
releasing unneeded flows before fully filling the reservoirs in order to leave reservoir space for 
capturing peak flows and potential flood waters.  If the United States’ beneficial-use rights are 
confirmed, these longstanding stream flow patterns would continue, and the United States would 
retain priority rights in waters physically stored in the reservoirs.   
 The confirmation of these rights cannot injure other water users in the Payette River 
system for two reasons.  First, any user who appropriated water (and water rights) under the river 
flow pattern that prevailed before federal flood-control operations began (or the 1966 priority 
date of the supplemental claims) would have a senior right.  Confirmation of the United States’ 
beneficial-use rights would not enable the United States to physically store any flows required to 
satisfy senior (pre-1966) downstream rights.  Second, any users who appropriated waters of the 
Payette River system after 1966 acquired rights that are subject to the United States’ senior 
beneficial-use rights and the river flow patterns resulting from flood-control operations.  
Confirmation of the United States’ beneficial-use rights cannot injure junior (post-1966) users 
because it would not alter the stream flows that were available to junior users when they acquired 
their water rights and that would remain available for the satisfaction of those rights. 
2.  The State and Suez Misconstrue the Supplemental Claims  
 Because the State and Suez cannot show injury in light of the above circumstances, they 
rely instead on the notion that confirmation of the supplemental claims would cause “per se” 
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injury.  See State Br. at 37, 41-42; Suez Br. at 31, 37.  As the State and Suez note (id.), an 
increase in the amount of water diverted ordinarily constitutes an “enlargement” of a water right, 
and there is “per se injury to junior water users anytime an enlargement receives priority.”  City 
of Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 835, 275 P.2d 845, 850 (2012) (quoting A & B Irrigation 
Dist. v. Aberdeen-American Falls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753, 118 P.3d 78, 85 
(2005)).  This “per se” injury rule was adopted, however, in the context of conventional 
diversions associated with “enlarged use[s].”  See A & B Irrigation Dist., 141 Idaho at 752, 118 
P.3d at 84.  Consistent with IDWR’s accounting rule (that all inflows are diversions), the United 
States’ supplemental claims assert diversion rights greater than use rights (rights to store for 
irrigation and power uses) solely to account for water passed through the reservoirs for flood-
control purposes.  More to the point, although the supplemental claims assert diversion rights 
greater than the United States’ decreed rights (as interpreted by IDWR’s accounting rule), the 
supplemental claims do not assert diversion rights greater than historical practice.  The 
supplemental claims simply describe historical practice in accordance with IDWR’s accounting 
rule.  In other words, even if the supplemental claims implicate an “enlargement” in relation to 
the decreed rights, they do not seek such “enlargement” under the priority date of the decreed 
rights.  They claim a junior priority date (of 1966), matching the date of historical “diversions” 
(inflows) toward beneficial use.  Accordingly, the “per se” injury rule is not implicated.   
 The State and Suez also argue (State Br. at 37, 42-43, Suez Br. at 35-36) that the 
supplemental claims must be improper because they would give the United States control over 
all stream flows.  As Suez acknowledges (Suez Br. at 40), however, on-stream reservoirs by 
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“their very nature * * * control the entire river.”  There is a fundamental difference between 
(a) controlling the river to regulate stream flows for flood-control purposes, and (b) appropriating 
all of the water of the river for beneficial use.  By claiming the right to divert all flows (assuming 
all inflows to be diversions), the United States is not claiming the right to appropriate all river 
water or to control the distribution of all river water for water-rights purposes.  In this regard, the 
State and Suez are simply mistaken in their assertions that the supplemental claims, if confirmed, 
would leave “no water legally available for use by junior appropriators,” State Br. at 37,12 or 
would “prevent future appropriations.”  Suez Br. at 42.  To be sure, confirmation of the 
supplemental claims would preclude junior users from calling on water physically stored in the 
Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs.  But Reclamation must pass or release any water not needed 
to physically fill the reservoirs up to the decreed storage rights, and any user is free to 
appropriate or use any unappropriated flows, including all flows passed or released for flood-
control purposes.  Likewise, IDWR would remain free to monitor federal use of reservoir storage 
rights (e.g., to ensure a single physical fill considering prior-year carry-over) and to permit and 
license new appropriations of unappropriated water.   
 Finally, the State and Suez argue that confirmation of the supplemental claims would 
alter the “historic status quo” established by IDWR’s 1993 accounting procedures, State Br. at 
                                                          
12 This quotation is from the State’s argument (State Br. at 37) addressing the alleged 
consequences of allowing the United States’ decreed rights to remain in priority notwithstanding 
flood-control releases.  The State similarly makes essentially the same argument (id. at 42-43) 
regarding the supplemental claims.  The State is mistaken in both cases. 
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36, and thus “diminish the priorities of junior water rights developed since [1993],” Suez Br. at 21.  
But IDWR adopted the accounting procedures informally before the final adjudication of the United 
States’ reservoir rights in the SRBA, the impact of the accounting procedures on the United States’ 
storage rights remains unresolved, and reservoir operations did not change.  Thus, the mere adoption 
of the 1993 accounting procedures did not alter the status quo for purposes of water appropriation.  
Moreover, the principal import of the 1993 accounting procedures was to remove the United States’ 
ability to store water under its decreed rights after the date of “paper fill.”  As Suez acknowledges 
(Suez Br. at 35), the rationale for this rule — apart from mere administrative expedience — was to 
“incentivize” the United States to store first-available flows and thus leave later-in-season stream 
flows to other users.  If the United States were to follow this course, flows after physical fill would 
generally arrive downstream when seasonal river flows are the highest, when flood risks are greatest, 
and when irrigators would have little (if any) ability to put the water to beneficial use.  The State and 
Suez do not argue that post-1993 appropriators relied on that outcome (which has yet to occur); nor 
do they advocate for that result.   
 To the contrary, the State specifically notes (State Br. at 38, n. 44) that it is “not challenging 
or objecting to federal flood control operations,” and Suez goes out of its way to construct a theory 
(Suez Br. at 44-47) as to how Reclamation may continue to “capture” and store “excess” water after 
“paper fill” as an “ancillary right.”  These arguments betray the State’s and Suez’s true agenda.  As 
Suez acknowledges (Suez Br. at 45-46), the proposed “ancillary right” cannot be enforced in 
“priority” against any other water user; it is merely the ability to store water (by sufferance) until any 
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other water user claims it.13  Thus, the “status quo” imagined by the State and Suez is one where 
flood control operations continue and where the waters physically stored in the reservoirs (after 
“paper fill”) are made available for distribution by IDWR to junior appropriators.  In this manner, in 
any year of flood-control releases, such other users would obtain the benefits of flood-control and 
priority rights in the stored waters, notwithstanding the fact that these other users — unlike Black 
Canyon and other contract space holders — do not pay for reservoir storage.  See United States v. 
Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 114-115, 157 P.3d 600, 608-09 (2006) (contract space holders pay 
share of reservoir construction and operations and maintenance costs).   
 While the State and Suez argue (State Br. at 39; Suez Br. at 44-46) that the United States and 
the contract space holders have yet to be injured by the 1993 accounting procedures (which to date 
have largely been a paper exercise), no water user needs to show injury as a precondition to asserting 
beneficial use rights.  Moreover, there can be no dispute that if the United States’ supplemental 
claims are disallowed, the United States will be injured.  The United States will lose the ability, in 
years where inflows exceed available reservoir capacity, to exercise its storage rights as a matter of 
right without discontinuing flood-control operations.  It is no response for the State and Suez to argue 
(id.) that actual harm has yet to occur.   
                                                          
13 Suez argues (Suez Br. at 45-46) that “no other right holder may call for [the] release” of 
“excess” water, once captured in the federal reservoirs.  When Reclamation physically stores 
natural flows that are not needed for and cannot be used in association with downstream water 
rights at the time of storage, the stored waters (which otherwise would be wasted) should not be 
subject to later delivery calls.  Cf. Washington County Irrigation Dist. v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382, 
386, 43 P.2d 943, 946 (1935) (“No one can make an appropriation from a reservoir * * * for the 
obvious reason that the waters so stored * * * are already diverted and appropriated * * *).  But 
if Reclamation cannot store inflows after “paper fill” as a matter of right, the inflows (as natural 
flows) would be subject to future appropriation by downstream users.   
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IV. The State and Suez Are Not Entitled To Attorney Fees 
 For reasons explained above and in the United States opening brief, the United States’ 
arguments on appeal are well grounded in law and fact and are meritorious.  The State and Suez 
have not demonstrated any basis for their claims (State Br. at 44; Suez Br. at 47) for attorneys’ 
fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, which authorizes attorney-fee awards to prevailing party only if 
the “nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” 
 In addition, the United States is not subject to attorney fee awards under Idaho Code 
§ 12-117.  As the State observes (State Br. at 44), the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity “submits the United States generally to state adjective law, as well as to 
state substantive law of water rights.”  United States v. Idaho ex rel. Director, Idaho Dept. of 
Water Resources, 508 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (emphasis added) (construing 43 U.S.C. § 666(a)).  But 
this “general” submission to “state adjective law” is not absolute.  Id. at 7.  The United States 
Supreme Court emphasized that waivers of sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally 
expressed,” id. at 6, and that courts must be “particularly alert to require a specific waiver of 
sovereign immunity before the United States may be held liable” for “monetary exactions * * * 
in litigation.”  Id. at 8-9.   
 The McCarran Amendment provides “[t]hat no judgment for costs shall be entered 
against the United States.” 43 U.S.C. § 666(a).  In light of this provision, the United States 
Supreme Court held that Idaho may not collect filing fees from the United States under Idaho 
Code § 42-1414, despite the State’s contention that filing fees are not like “costs,” a term 
traditionally reserved for “items of expense incurred in litigation that a prevailing party is 
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allowed by rule to tax against the losing party.”  Idaho, 508 U.S. at 7-8.  Attorneys’ fee awards 
under Idaho Code § 12-117 are more like “costs” as defined above than the filing fees the United 
States Supreme Court has already held to be non-recoverable.  Given the proviso prohibiting a 
judgment of “costs,” the McCarran Amendment cannot be construed as providing a “specific 
waiver” for such attorneys’ fee awards.14  See Idaho, 508 U.S. at 8-9. 
  
                                                          
14 At the time the McCarran Amendment was enacted, the United States was generally immune 
from any method of cost-shifting in litigation, whether by a judgment for costs or by otherwise 
requiring litigants to pay litigation expenses, attorneys’ fees, or interest.  See United States v. 
Chem. Found., 272 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1926) (recognizing the United States’ “sovereign prerogative 
not to pay costs”); see also The Antelope, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 546, 550 (1827).  If Congress had 
intended to waive the United States’ long-standing immunity from costs and attorneys’ fees, it 
would have done so explicitly.  See United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 
(1992) (Congress is presumed to be aware of the “common rule” that “any waiver of the 




 For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the United States’ opening brief (May 
12, 2017), this Court should reverse the decision of the district court dismissing the United 
States’ supplemental claims or, in the alternative, affirm the district court on the grounds that the 
decreed rights for Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs enable the United States to fill the 
reservoirs up to the decreed amounts after releases for flood-control purposes. 
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